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1 Introduction
The UK sugar beet industry involves numerous organisations, companies and indi-
viduals operating from different locations and with different objectives and incen-
tives. The aim of the Study Group was to understand the process well enough to
model it and to propose ways in which these organisations companies and individ-
uals (collectively described as players) could exchange information and interact, in
ways that would result in greater efficiency, and to the benefit of everyone involved
in the process. Much of what was done relates specifically to sugar beet, but there
are other crops where similar issues arise — though of course each crop will have
its own idiosyncrasies.
1.1 Background and scope
(1.1.1) We aim to describe here the way the UK sugar beet industry operates at
present. It is presented diagrammatically in Figure 1. In subsection 1.2
we shall describe the perceived inefficiencies in the present system, and in
subsection 1.3 the elements of the system that are most easily changeable,
and so could be used as controls or incentives.
(1.1.2) Sugar beet is grown mainly in eastern England, and there are perhaps
3000 growers, with widely differing acreages. The beet can be lifted from
the fields (i.e. harvested) from mid-September onwards. The beet cannot
be lifted if the soil is too wet, or if the soil is baked too hard. The beet
should be lifted before the first frost. When the beet is lifted it is stored
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Figure 1: Schematic of the sugar beet production chain.
on a concrete pad on the farm. If there is risk of frost, the beet will need
to be stored covered.
(1.1.3) From the pads on the farms, the beet is taken to a processing plant in
30-tonne trucks operated by hauliers. The distance of a grower from the
processing plant can be up to 50 miles, with an average of 28. There
are about 100 haulier companies, including large firms like DHL, small
local haulage companies, and some trucks owned by individual growers.
So some have just 1 truck and some have hundreds. The truck drivers can
work 9 hours a day, or 10 hours on at most 2 days a week. A large haulier
will have a number of drivers so its trucks may be able to operate for more
hours a day than a truck belonging to a small company or an individual
grower.
(1.1.4) The 5 processing plants in the UK are operated by British Sugar. The
beet is unloaded from the trucks onto a large concrete pad (at the plant
in Bury St. Edmunds, the pad is 150m by 40m and the stack can be up
to 6m high). The plant can process about 800 truckloads a day, and the
storage pad can hold about 1400 truckloads. The processing capacity of
the plant varies by about ±10% from day to day for various unpredictable
2
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reasons. From the stack, the beet is pushed by bulldozers into a water
channel that sweeps it along to the processing plant itself. It is processed
into syrup and then dry sugar. The beet is sampled to assess its sugar
content when it arrives at the plant.
(1.1.5) There used to be more processing plants, but the reduction to 5 has not
been accompanied by a proportional increase in capacity so the processing
season has been extended, and now runs to February. The whole season,
from mid-September when lifting starts, through to February when all the
beet has been processed, is called the Campaign. The processing plants
operate 24 hours a day during the campaign.
(1.1.6) At present the initial planning of the Campaign is undertaken by British
Sugar, and is at the 1-week granularity. So they plan that the beet of
certain growers will be lifted in particular weeks, and be brought to a
particular plant in particular weeks. They also offer a centralized haulage
plan to the growers: in the centralized plan, a grower contracts to provide a
certain tonnage of beet at his farm to be ready in a certain week. There are
20 hauliers who supply services to British Sugar as part of this centrally-
organised system. Alternatively, a grower can choose to arrange his own
haulage, in which case British Sugar pay him a certain allowance per
ton-mile for the transport, based on the shortest road distance from his
farm to the processing plant. He then uses his own truck or makes his
own arrangements with a haulier or another grower who has a truck. His
contract then is to provide a certain tonnage at the plant in the specified
week.
(1.1.7) The payment from British Sugar to the grower is based on the sugar
content of his crop. When it arrives at the plant, a sample is taken for
analysis and the weight of sugar per weight of beet is assessed. The sugar
content varies depending on the beet variety, the soil, and the weather
conditions during the growing season — sunny days and rain at night are
the best. After the end of the growing season (mid-September) the sugar
content of the beet in the ground is constant. The sugar content can vary
between 15% and 21%. When it is lifted and is waiting on the pad at the
farm, sugar content is lost, at a rate of about 0.1% per day. When beet is
pushed around by the bulldozers at the processing plant, sugar content is
also lost — anything that damages the beet loses sugar content. The rate
paid by British Sugar to the growers rises steadily during the Campaign
period and is about 15% greater in February than it was as the start of
the campaign in mid-September.
1.2 Inefficiencies
(1.2.1) The perceived inefficiencies in the present system are illustrated diagram-
matically in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Perceived inefficiencies in the present process.
(1.2.2) At the processing plant, one of the inefficiencies that can arise is if the
beet backlog builds up too much — i.e. the amount of beet in the stack
awaiting processing. The sugar loss from pushing this beet around with
the bulldozers is kept smallest if this backlog is kept small.
(1.2.3) For the growers, one of the inefficiencies is the loss of sugar while their
beet is waiting on the pad at their farm: the grower wants the interval
between lifting the beet and processing it to be small.
(1.2.4) For the hauliers, one of the inefficiencies is the journeys they make with
an empty truck at the beginning of a day to their first farm, and at the
end of the day from the plant back to the haulage company.
1.3 Possible changes
(1.3.1) One of the possible changes that could be implemented in the system
would be to alter the price paid by the processing plant to the growers.
4
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1.4 Literature
(1.4.1) A study of transport efficiency in the sugar beet industry was prepared in
2009 [1]. A study of coupled supply planning and logistics with reference
to the sugar cane industry in South Africa is published as [2]. This has
quite similar aims to our project.
(1.4.2) We find some very helpful literature, studying sugar-cane industry in Aus-
tralia and South Africa. They study various optimisation problems aris-
ing from different aspects of the industry and implement some simulation
tools. Although the majority of the previous study only focus on a single
aspect and do not integrate different factors into a single framework, some
analysis are well worthy of mentioning: on a short term horizon, [7] studies
the the optimisation of harvest schedules, accounting for the geographical
and temporal differences in sugar yield; [9] investigates the coordination
between transportation and harvest. On a mid-term horizon, works like
[8] study sugar production maximization in the context of yearly planning.
(1.4.3) On the other hand, a study of coupled supply planning and logistics with
reference to the sugar cane industry in South Africa is published [2]. This
has quite similar aims to our project. Their study examines multiple-level
planning and adopts a two step simulation to integrate seasonal planning
with the short-term logistic. It introduces two simulation tools, MAGI for
seasonal supply planning and ARENA for daily supply, to investigate the
effects of various factors that could potentially impact the campaign, in-
cluding harvesting mechanism, vehicles, milling season, and sensitivity to
risk. Based on the simulation results their study discusses outcomes un-
der different scenarios, which can facilitate negotiations between different
parties.
(1.4.4) Another study, of the sugar cane industry in South America, is in [3] and
uses discrete event simulation.
[Christoph, if you write a summary of that it could go here.]
(1.4.5) Some of the possibly-relevant mathematical literature includes that on
games with exhaustible resources, for instance the work of Tom Hosking
[4]. This could perhaps be developed with say 2 growers, one close to the
plant and one far away, so they have different transport costs, and with
the plant as another player, having the aim of keeping a steady inflow of
beet.
2 Strategy
In this report we first consider various elements of the problem in some isolation, and
then consider the issues in putting them together. We first describe the economic
models considered, then stochastic models that study the effects of the uncertainties
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in the system, then some scheduling models that are intended to achieve some of
the potential efficiencies better than the current process.
3 Economic models
3.1 Pricing models
(3.1.1) If the price paid by the processing plant to the growers can be chosen in
a way that makes the growers neutral between different times for lifting
their beet, then that should enable any possible efficiencies in the transport
process to be taken advantage of more easily.
(3.1.2) One of the ingredients in modelling this is that it is beneficial to the grower
to have his beet lifted early, since he can then reuse that field, preparing
it for whatever its next crop is to be. There is therefore a utility function
to the grower of lifting the beet at time t, and it is a decreasing function
of t. All the beet needs to be lifted by the time of the first frost, so a
simple form of the utility function would be
U(t) = U0max(1− t/Tfrost, 0), (1)
for a suitable constant U0 and with t measured from the start of the
campaign period.
(3.1.3) One way of incorporating this insight into a simplified economic model is
as follows. In this model, the growers are aggregated together, and also
the beet awaiting processing is aggregated together. Also the model as
written here is deterministic, and would need modifications to allow for
stochastic effects.
(3.1.4) For the growers, we let q(t) denote their combined production rate, and
p(t) be the price paid by the plant to the grower. Then the payoff to the
grower is modelled as
∫ T
0
p(t)q(t) exp(−rt)− cq(t) dt. (2)
In this, the discount factor exp(−rt) is representing the fact that the
grower prefers to have his beet collected early. The constant c represents
the growers’ cost per tonne. The amount of beet initially is some x0, the
total crop, and the lifting process is represented by dx/dt = −q(t) with
the constraints that x and q must not go negative.
(3.1.5) The amount of beet in storage is denoted by Q(t) so dQ/dt = q − q¯,
where q¯ is the rate at which beet is taken from the storage to the factory.
Naturally, Q and q¯ must also not go negative.
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(3.1.6) The payoff function to the plant is modelled in the form
∫ T
0
−p(t)q(t)− f(Q(t)) + q¯(t)P dt. (3)
Here the first term is the price the plant is paying to the growers. The
second models the cost represented by the amount of beet in storage some-
where in the system, so f is an increasing function of Q. The third term
represents the gain for producing sugar, so P is the current price for sugar.
(3.1.7) Solving this model as a game for the growers and plant then consists in
the growers choosing q(t) to maximize their payoff, and the plant choosing
p(t) and q¯(t) to maximize its payoff.
(3.1.8) For the growers, the solution is by introducing their value function from
any point, V (x(t), t), and then the result is that they choose q(t) to max-
imize (
p(t)− c−
∂V
∂x
)
q(t). (4)
(3.1.9) For the plant, the optimal point over q¯
3.2 Cooperative games
(3.2.1) A cooperative game is one where the cooperation of the players in a coali-
tion generates surplus value. There is then the theory of Shapley value
that determines a fair way to distribute that value to the partners in a
coalition. Each player receives a value that is the average gain in value
that adding him brings, if the coalition is formed sequentially in a random
order.
(3.2.2) The Shapley-Gale algorithm is a matching algorithm where the partici-
pants have expressed preferences among the possible options available to
them. It could potentially be used to implement the matching of growers
to time-slots in the hauliers schedule.
(3.2.3) There are 3 elements to the problem,
(a) maximizing the surplus that the process generates (so this involves
minimizing sugar loss on the pads in the fields, minimizing trans-
port costs, and minimizing sugar loss at the processing plant); also
the surplus is a random variable, so some scalar function has to be
chosen, (e.g. the mean, the median, the probability of it exceeding
some threshold);
(b) allocating the actual surplus to the participants fairly;
(c) transparency — assuring the participants that the process is treating
them fairly.
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(3.2.4) If objective 1 can be solved, then it results in a surplus that could be
allocated among the participants. This surplus then needs to be shared
among the participants in a way that is generally perceived to be fair.
(3.2.5) It was suggested that a certain proportion of the payments should be
transferred directly from the plant to the growers and from the growers to
the hauliers, as at present, with a certain amount kept back. This retained
portion of the collective surplus could then be distributed at the end of
the campaign period, in a way that reflects each player’s contribution to
achieving the maximum possible surplus, or penalizes their contribution
to failing to achieve the maximum surplus.
4 Stochastic models
4.1 Weather correlation
(4.1.1) If we plan to collect the beet in a certain order, and we wish to keep the
supply of beet to the processing plant robust to the effects of weather in
delaying the delivery schedule, then it is natural to expect that we should
collect from separated areas at the same time: if the plan were to involve
collecting from growers in the same area at the same time, then it is not
robust to bad weather in that area.
4.2 Summary
(4.2.1) The delivery date of different growers is influenced by the weather. As-
suming that the weather hits all growers in a certain region simultaneously
and similarly, we analyse how one should sort the growers to lower produc-
tion’s fluctuation. To do so, we analyse a stylised model in which growers
are divided into two regions, each with a local weather component. The
objective is to optimally mix the growers of these two regions such that the
expected excess harvest is minimized. We start by describing the model
in detail, then we describe the simulation and we finally conclude.
4.3 Description of Model
(4.3.1) We assume that growers are split into two regions that will be processed
over two periods. More specifically, we have NE growers in the east and
NW growers in the west. Further, we assume that there is only one pro-
cessing plant, which is able to process C growers’ output per period. Let
x be the percentage of growers in the east scheduled to be processed in the
first period and let y the percentage of growers in the west also scheduled
to be processed in the first period.
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(4.3.2) If a grower is scheduled to deliver in a certain period, he may not —
depending on the weather — be able to lift his sugar beet when intended.
The weather TR,Pi at the location of grower i in region R ∈ {E,W} and
period P is assumed to be stochastic and in our case modelled as the
weighted average of two normally distributed random variables:
TR,Pi = ρ
RNR,P +
√
1− (ρR)2NPi , (5)
where NR,P and NPi , are assumed to be independent normally distributed.
Notice this implies that TR,Pi is again normally distributed. The parameter
ρR measures the correlation between the weather within a region. Further
we assume that the grower i is not able to lift if his local weather is below
a certain threshold ctresh. This implies that the total number of growers
processed in period one is given by
G1 =
⌊xNE⌋∑
k=1
1(TE,1
k
<ctresh)
+
⌊yNW ⌋∑
k=1
1(TW,1
k
<ctresh)
. (6)
(4.3.3) In the second period, all growers which could not be processed in the first
period (there are (G1 −C)
+ of them) are processed and all other growers
have another chance to lift their crops. The total number of sugar beet
which could be processed in the second period is therefore given by,
G2 = (G1 − C)
++ (7)
⌊xNE⌋∑
k=1
1(TE,1
k
≥ctresh)
1(TE,2
k
<ctresh)
+
⌊yNW ⌋∑
k=1
1(TW,1
k
≥ctresh)
1(TW,2
k
<ctresh)
+
(8)
NE∑
⌈xNE⌉
1(TE,2
k
<ctresh)
+
NW∑
⌈xNW ⌉
1(TW,2
k
<ctresh)
. (9)
(10)
An inefficiency occurs whenever sugar beet is lifted but cannot be pro-
cessed on the same period.
(4.3.4) Therefore, we propose to minimize the following objective:
V (x, y) = E[(G1 − C)
+(G2 − C)
+] (11)
The two terms represent the excess amount of lifted beet over the process-
ing capacity in the first and second period respectively.
4.4 Description of Simulation
(4.4.1) We evaluate the function V using a Monte-Carlo simulation with 1000
iterations. To ensure comparability, we fix a seed for all simulations.
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The parameters in our simulation are given in the following table. The
parameter ctresh is chosen such that the probability to lift if scheduled is
90 %. The capacity is chosen in such a way that it matches the expected
number of lifted beet. To test for robustness, all results are reported for
a low correlation and a high correlation regime.
Name Parameters 1 Parameters 2
NW 50 50
NE 50 50
ρW 0.2 0.9
ρE 0.2 0.9
C 45 45
P(WR,Pj < ctresh) 0.1 0.1
Table 1: This table shows the parameters used in the simulation.
4.5 Simulation Results and Interpretation
(4.5.1) Figures 1 and 2 show heat maps of the value function for different strate-
gies. Since the color in the heat maps is mainly arranged by lines, we can
infer that the absolute number farmers, which is to be processed in the
first week, should be constant. In the case of large correlation, it seems
to be optimal to schedule 45 growers to lift, such that all beet in the first
period can always be processed. In the case of low correlation, we find
that 50 growers in the first period are optimal, such that the expected
number of growers is equal to the capacity of the processing plant.
(4.5.2) Further, since the heat map is darker towards the middle, we can infer
that it is better to have an equal amount of growers from the east and
west scheduled for the first period, compared to a polarized split.
(4.5.3) To gain a better understanding of the underlying mechanic, figures 3 and
4 show the distribution of lifted beet for the different regimes. The first
thing to notice is that in the high correlation regime, most of the outcomes
correspond to all scheduled growers lifting the beet. In the low correlation
regime, the distribution is centered around its mean. This might explain
the optimal amount of growers to be processed in every week. In both
regimes, scheduling growers from different regions reduces the tail of the
distribution. The implied reduction in risk makes it optimal to diversify
the regions within a given period.
4.6 Conclusion
(4.6.1) We have analyzed how to optimally schedule a number of sugar beet grow-
ers, which are influenced by regional effects, to lift their beet in order to
10
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Figure 1: The figure shows a heat map of the value function V for the first set
of parameter values. The axis show the proportion in the east (x) and west (y)
respectively. A value in the red spectrum corresponds to a lower value function.
be processed by a plant with limited capacity. Two different regimes were
considered. In the case of strong comovement within a region, it seems
optimal to schedule a number of growers equal to the capacity. In the
case of weak comovement, it seems to be better to schedule a number of
growers such that the expected number of lifts is equal to the capacity. In
any case, better results seemed to be achieved by scheduling growers from
different regions within a given period.
4.7 Markov process model
(4.7.1) The collecting and transport and processing of the beet to minimize sugar
loss could be considered as a random process — the randomness repre-
senting all the uncertainties in the system, including the weather but not
limited to that. If the random process is modelled as a Markov process
then one way of thinking of the aims would be as minimizing some inte-
grated cost function that is the expected cost integrated over the Cam-
11
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Figure 2: The figure shows a heat map of the value function V for the second set
of parameter values. The axis show the proportion in the east (x) and west (y)
respectively. A value in the red spectrum corresponds to a lower value function.
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(b) x = 0.5, y = 0.5
Figure 3: Distribution of G1 with correlation ρ
E = ρW = 0.2 for different mixtures
of east and west population.
paign period,
Ex
(∫ T
0
c(X(t)) dt
)
, (12)
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(a) x = 1, y = 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
(b) x = 0.5, y = 0.5
Figure 4: Distribution of G1 with correlation ρ
E = ρW = 0.9 for different mixtures
of east and west population.
where X(t) is the underlying Markov process, and f(X) is the cost per
unit time incurred when the state is X. We now describe the way that we
implemented this approach in a simple case.
(4.7.2) We model the process using a finite state, continuous time Markov chain
in order to include random processes affecting the system, generated by
individuals changing their plans and decisions due to, for example but not
limited to, the weather.
(4.7.3) We considered a simple case where there are two farms, farm A and farm B,
one processing plant, one transport system, and one elevator. We assume
each farm produces one unit of beet and that multiple farms waiting for
transport incurs a storage cost. We assume that the transport system can
transport just one unit of beet at a time. We assume additionally that the
processing plant is at maximal capacity with one unit of beet, and that
any additional units of beet over this one unit incur a storage cost.
(4.7.4) Therefore we consider a 3 dimensional state space, A × B × P , with one
dimension for each farm and a third dimension for the processing plant.
Each dimension can be in one of three states. For the farms these are;
• Beets growing (state 0),
• Beets ready for transport (state 1),
• Beets left the farm (state 2).
For the processing plants these are;
• Operating under capacity (state 0),
• Operating at capacity (state 1),
• Operating over capacity, needing to store (state 2).
(4.7.5) In total there are 27 possible states this system can be in, but some are
13
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{0, 0, 0} 
 ✒
❅
❅❘
{1, 0, 0}
❅
❅❘
 
 ✒
{0, 1, 0} 
 ✒
❅
❅❘
{1, 1, 0} 
 ✒
❅
❅❘
{2, 0, 1} 
 ✒
❅
❅❘
{0, 2, 1} 
 ✒
❅
❅❘
{2, 0, 0}
❅
❅❘
{2, 1, 1} 
 ✒
❅
❅❘
{1, 2, 1} 
 ✒
❅
❅❘
{0, 2, 0} 
 ✒
{2, 1, 0}
❆
❆
❆
❆❆❯{2, 2, 2} ✲
{1, 2, 0}✁
✁
✁
✁✁✕
{2, 2, 1} ✲ {2, 2, 0}
Figure 5: The state space, S, and the acceptable transitions
not permitted. For example, {0, 0, 2} (which represents both farms with
beets growing and plant operating over capacity) is not a permitted state
as we cannot have the processing plant working over capacity prior to any
beets leaving the farms. We move between the permitted 15 states with
the transitions given by figure 5. We assign a rate, λi to each move.
(4.7.6) One way of thinking of the aims in this context would be as minimizing
some integrated cost function that is the expected cost integrated over the
Campaign period. We assign a cost, f , to each state and this can include
a penalty for being in a wasteful or inefficient state. f in state i is the cost
per unit time that the chain incurs by remaining in this state. In this way
the cost function should force the system to avoid paths which include
higher cost states. From this approach we can find a set of rates which
minimise the integrated cost function, indicating the rates that would
lead to the system with smallest cost. The ratio of the two optimum rates
leaving the same state indicates which direction in the state diagram will
be favoured, indicating the preferred method to minimise the cost. A more
detailed explanation of the technical aspects is given in the Appendix.
(4.7.7) With the tools just presented, the expected value of this cost can be
estimated as a function of the parameters (i.e. the transition rates and
the cost function). In principle, one could simply minimise the expected
cost with respect to the parameters, but this would gives us the trivial
result that the rates should be as large as possible (i.e. if all the rates are
large enough, everything happens so quickly that the chain incurs almost
no cost, regardless of the states it visits). Therefore, we minimise the
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following “overall” cost function, rather than just the expected cost:
E[Γ|X(0) = 0] +
∑
i
λi
(4.7.8) In this scenario, large rates are penalised because they have a large con-
tribution in the “overall” cost. Bearing in mind our problem this is also
a fair assumption, since large rates might represent, for instance, a faster
processing rate at the plant which will be more expensive.
(4.7.9) In order to simplify the model sufficiently so we can visualise the solutions,
we initially consider just a few different rates; λ1 the rate at which the
beets become ready on all of the farms, λ2 the rate at which the beets get
delivered from all of the farms to the processing plant, and λ3 the rate
the processing plant processes beets. We assign the same cost of 1 to each
state, except for states we have identified as wasteful states to be in. These
are {1, 1, 0}; the state where all farms have beets awaiting transportation
and becoming less sugar-rich, and {2, 2, 2}; the state where the processing
plant is operating at over-capacity so more beets wait in storage there.
We assign these states the cost 1 + p. Additionally, the states {2, 0, 0},
{2, 1, 0}, {0, 2, 0}, {1, 2, 0} reflect the processing plant operating under
capacity and these will also be penalised, but with penalty p1 < p.
(4.7.10) In this simple model the allowed transitions are fully specified by the
following generator matrix:


−2λ1 λ1 λ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −λ1 − λ2 0 λ2 λ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −λ1 − λ2 0 λ1 λ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −λ1 − λ3 0 0 λ3 λ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −2λ2 0 0 λ2 λ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −λ1 − λ3 0 0 λ1 λ3 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ1 0 0 0 λ1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ2 − λ3 0 0 λ3 λ2 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ2 − λ3 0 0 λ2 λ3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ1 0 0 λ1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ1 0 0 λ1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ2 0 0 λ2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ3 0 λ3 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ2 λ2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −λ3 λ3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0


(4.7.11) From this simple scenario we can generate plots like that depicted in fig-
ure 6. This tells us that in the optimal case once a farm is ready to
transport its beets this transportation should occur prior to other farms
becoming ready (λ2 ≈ 4λ1).
(4.7.12) We then add one extra level of complexity to this model by considering
5 different rates; λ1,A, λ1,B the rate at which the beets become ready on
each of the farms, λ2,A, λ2,B the rate at which the beets get delivered from
each of the farms to the processing plant, and λ3 as before. This takes
into account, for example, the differences in distances between farms and
the processing plant. This can give results like that depicted in figure 7.
This tells us, among other things, that one farm should have a slower rate
of production than the other (λ2,B < 1 = λ2,A).
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Figure 6: The contour plot of the overall cost function, with fixed parameters λ3 = 1,
p = 100, p1 = 10.
Figure 7: The contour plot of the overall cost function, with fixed parameters
λ1,A = λ2,A = λ3 = 1, p = 100, p1 = 10.
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4.8 Limitations and Extensions
(4.8.1) From this simple model, we have seen that some general qualitative fea-
tures of the system can be described. A step towards a description closer to
reality would require us to define a Markov process on a larger state space,
including more farms, transportation companies and processing plants.
Due to time limitations, this larger model has not been implemented but
the method would extend very easily. For very large state spaces, the
generator matrix would be sparse (due to the limited amount of allowed
transitions) and a sparse linear solver could be used to obtain the solution.
(4.8.2) Due to its simplicity, however, this model has some limitations as well.
In particular, it is not meant to provide a comparison to real data or
to estimate the monetary cost of the Campaign. Moreover, the Markov
nature of this model is meant to take into account stochastic effects (such
as weather conditions) which might play a relevant role in the Campaign,
but the validity of the assumption of a Markovian process would need a
deeper assessment.
5 Scheduling models
Although the aim of the Study Group is not to produce scheduling methods, we did
consider that scheduling methods having the required efficiency measures as part
of the cost function would be one of the ingredients needed in any final system.
The scheduling problem we would like to address concerns the ordering of beet
transport from numerous farms to a single beet processing plant in order to optimise
the processing rate whilst ensuring that the time beets are left to accumulate outside
the plant is kept to a minimum.
5.1 Problem Outline
(5.1.1) Consider a single beet processing plant surrounded by N farms Fi each
located at a distance di from the beet plant. The quantity of beet in tons
at each farm is Qi and the number of trucks working moving between to
that farm and the plant at time ti is Ni. We assume that all the trucks
travel at the same speed v and have the same capacity of Ct tons. So the
rate Rk(ti) at which farm Fk can deliver to the plant is given by
Rk(ti) =
NiQkv
2dk
ton s−1. (13)
The 2 in the denominator is due to the fact that the trucks must make a
round trips, each of which is twice di. We also assume that only a portion
of all the farms can operate for 24 hours. Finally we assume that the
beet plant can process beets at a constant rate of RP tons per hour for 24
hours.
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(5.1.2) We shall consider one day and aim to deduce close to the optimal order-
ing of beet collection from the farms in order to optimise the rate of beet
processing at the plant whilst minimising the accumulation of beets out-
side the plant. In order to do this we shall decide upon a preferred (near
optimal) profile for the rate of beet delivery at the plant throughout the
day based on heurisitic arguments. Then we shall employ a least squares
approach which shall order the deliveries from the farms in order to get
at close to this profile as possible.
5.2 Beet delivery rate
(5.2.1) The preferred beet delivery rate profile can be chosen. Here we employ
some heuristic arguments to choose an example profile. We are given that
some, but not all farms, operate for the entire 24 hour period. We suppose
that there are not enough 24 hour farms to achieve the beet processing
rate RP so we require an accumulation of beets before the end of the
working day so that the plant can achieve RP at night. This suggests that
a profile as shown in Figure 8 would be sensible.
Time (hours)0 Day Night
Rate
RP
Figure 8: Solid line is the proposed profile for rate of beet arrival at plant. Dashed
line is the processing rate of the plant.
5.3 Re-scheduling
(5.3.1) We can assume our original schedule, in which each haulier delivers beet to
the plant at a constant rate throughout a period of length T time intervals
(of some desired granularity), to be of the form
M =


R1(t1) R2(t1) . . . RN(t1)
R1(t2) R2(t2) . . . RN(t2)
...
...
...
R1(tT ) R2(tT ) . . . RN(tT )




a1
...
aN

 =


f(t1)
f(t2)
...
f(t24)

 ,
Here the vector ak corresponds to the distance of farm k, so ak = 1/(2dk),
whilst Rk(ti) corresponds to the rate at which beets are hauled from farm
k at time ti, so as in (13). The default case is where each Rk(ti) and
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f(ti) is constant over time ti. Denote this default schedule as R0. This
will in turn result in a constant RHS vector F0. Suppose we require some
alternative RHS vector F, given that the vector a is fixed, how can we
reschedule so that, for example, there is an increase in beet rate towards
the end of the day? Suppose that our desired schedule matrix R = R0+R˜,
where R˜ corresponds to the changes made to the default schedule, which
gives us our new RHS rate vector F = F0+ F˜ . We now have a new system
derived from this,
R˜a = F˜ .
This system corresponds to the reshuffling of the schedule, if R˜ = 0 and
R˜ = 0 then no rescheduling has taken place. But suppose we have a desired
new schedule F ; then we need to find R˜ which gives us F˜ = F − F0.
Whilst the system is under determined, it will typically have infinitely
many solutions. Intuitively, the rate will increase when more of the trucks
are moving from nearby farms, as the travel time from the farm to the
plant is shorter. Also, there are certain properties about R˜ which must
hold.
(a) As the number of trucks working at any time ti is constant, all en-
tries of each row of R˜ must add up to zero. In other words, if an
extra truck is working at one farm, it means one fewer is working
somewhere else.
(b) As the total number of beets needing to be hauled over the whole
day is fixed, all entries of each column of R˜ must add up to zero.
In other words, if less beet is going to be hauled at one hour, then
more will have to be hauled later on to make up for this.
(c) For every entry of the matrix −Qi ≤ Rk(ti) ≤ Qi, i.e. no more than
all of the beets of a single farm can be moved in one go.
(5.3.2) We shall call every type of matrix that satisfies these properties a ‘beet
matrix’. Due to the first and second constraints, an N ×M beet matrix
has (N−1)×(M−1) degrees of freedom. Note that F is also a beet matrix,
as an increase in rate at one time will mean a corresponding decrease in
rate at another. Note also that a linear combination of beet matrices is
also a beet matrix. Define a ’simple beet matrix’ to be a matrix with only
four non-zero entries, which lie in a square. For example, consider the
simple beet matrix
A(m,n,x,y) =


am,n = −1
am+x,n+y = −1
am+x,n = 1
am,n+y = 1
(All other entries zero)
(5.3.3) Although this has not yet been attempted, it is suspected that R˜ can
be constructed by taking a linear combination of these. The proposed
method is as follows
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(a) Sort the vector a from low to high.
(b) Use a multiple of the beet matrix A(1, T −1, N−1, 1) to ensure that
the bottom entry of F˜ is met. This is essentially taking the trucks
from the farthest farm and shuffling them to the nearest farm at the
end of the day to boost the rate at this time.
(c) Moving up one row of F at a time, use the row above in A˜ to help
correct for the previous step. The second beet matrix added will be
A(1, T − 2, N − 1, 1) .
(d) If the third beet matrix constraint is ever violated, move in to
columns modify columns 2 and N − 1 instead, moving in additional
columns if necessary.
(e) There will be no remaining row to correct the top row - but this will
not matter. We know that the desired RHS F˜ is also a beet matrix,
so provided F˜2 to F˜T are as required then F˜1 must be as required,
as there are only T − 1 degrees of freedom in the beet matrix F˜ , so
the entry F˜1 must be as required.
Unfortunately there was not enough time to test this method during the
week, but hopefully this or something similar could be used.
6 Prediction markets for campaign planning
6.1 Description of prediction markets
(6.1.1) We will start with the definition given by Leigh and Wolfers: predic-
tion markets are markets where participants trade contracts whose payoff
depends on unknown future events. The defining feature of a prediction
market is that the price of these contracts can be directly interpreted as
a market-generated forecast of some unknown quantity. [10] Their mech-
anism relies on the efficient markets hypothesis: the price of a financial
security or prediction market contract reflects all available information.
[10] Therefore prediction markets are an example of efficient crowdsourc-
ing — aggregating dispersed, and often contradictory, knowledge from a
group of people to obtain very precise information about the outcome of
a future event.
(6.1.2) Modern approach to prediction markets began in 1988, when three econo-
mists of the Iowa University created a market to predict the outcome of
the presidential election (Bush vs Dukakis). It was observed that in any
given moment in time such market gave much better forecast than all
major polls. The experiment has been carried on for many other elections
and the comparison shows that it beats all polls in about 75% of the times.
The advantage of markets is even bigger when the time to election is long.
[11]
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(6.1.3) After the success of Iowa Electronic Markets the interest in prediction
markets grew rapidly. Currently markets are used by many large corpora-
tions (Google, Microsoft, IBM, Lockheed Martin, etc.) as a tool to assess
the probability that a project will end as planned, that a sales goal will
be achieved or as a tool to estimate the market potential of innovative
products. [12] For instance, General Electric has been running markets
for new ideas and products originated by employees. Eli Lilly, a large
pharmaceutical company, ran a prediction market to support choice of
new drugs for further development, primary decision factor being mar-
ket potential. Further, in the BRAIN1 project — an internal research at
Hewlett-Packard, it was shown how to run prediction markets with small
numbers of participants (up to 10 people) and still obtain meaningful re-
sults.
(6.1.4) Apart from internal corporate applications there are also many publicly
available commercial markets (e.g. Hollywood Stock Exchange, Intrade),
where operators often profit from fees or selling complex analyses derived
from the market data. Furthermore, even DARPA2 and IARPA3 have im-
plemented prediction markets [13], mainly to obtain accurate predictions
important for the American military or intelligence community.
6.2 Reliable information source for campaign planning
(6.2.1) Prediction markets are primarily a source of information that can be ag-
gregated efficiently from their participants. This property allows to use
them to reduce the uncertainties in the process of campaign planning. For
instance, the information that could possibly be gathered through a pre-
diction market encompass the main time points of the campaign (start,
peaks, end), predictions about the quality of the soil and about yield in
different regions and time periods.
(6.2.2) Another very important benefit from the use of prediction markets is the
fact that all parties, including farmers, would be involved in the campaign
planning process, everyone could feel that his voice is heard and that he
can have impact on the entire process. Such a prediction market could (or
even should) be incorporated into a larger system for campaign planning,
which in part would work as a public consultation platform.
(6.2.3) For instance, take one of the biggest uncertainties in the planning process
— the yield from fields. On one hand it depends on such hard to predict
1Behaviorally Robust Aggregation of Information in Networks
2Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency — an American government agency supporting
large scientific projects that might be useful for military purposes
3Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency — the counterpart of DARPA devoted to
intelligence purposes
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factors as weather. The knowledge of the team involved in the campaign
planning will probably rely to a great extent on the data from weather fore-
casts. However due to experience using market for crowdsourcing farmers
might give better results. For example the futures market for orange juice
concentrate predicts Florida weather better than the National Weather
Service does. [11] There are also additional factors best known to the
people that are in the field (figuratively and literally). These include: the
quality of the soil (variable and dependent on recent usage history), his-
torical yields, information from the current season, such as the schedule
of all agricultural tasks that have been done or are to be done (sowing,
fertilization, irrigation). All this data is of great significance for predicting
the yield throughout the campaign.
(6.2.4) All this information can be easily aggregated into yield forecasts by a
properly set prediction market involving farmers. Others participants are
also welcome, as they increase diversification of information that in turn
can enhance accuracy of a prediction market ([10] and [12]). The questions
on the market, that have to be binary, could ask about several levels of
yields for every district or county separately. As an example we provide a
set of questions for Uttlesford district in Essex county for one given week
would take the form 4:
The yield in Uttlesford district from 6 to 12 October to be below
3000 tons.
The yield in Uttlesford district from 6 to 12 October to be over 3000
and below 6000 tons.
The yield in Uttlesford district from 6 to 12 October to be over 6000
below 9000 tons.
The yield in Uttlesford district from 6 to 12 October to be over 9000
tons.
Similar sets of questions could be posed for every district or county for
every week (or even every day) of interest.
(6.2.5) Such a prediction market could be incorporated into a larger software
tool that would use different algorithms and solutions to help in the cam-
paign planning process and would allow for fast and efficient information
exchange between all parties involved in the campaign.
7 Interaction models
In this section we describe some of the possible mechanisms that were discussed for
how the different participants in the system could usefully interact with each other,
following the information-gathering that can be effected by a prediction market.
4Number of toms and dates are arbitrary.
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Broadly speaking the mechanisms discussed were for how they can exchange bids
and offers.
7.1 Bidding and offering processes
(7.1.1) We have discussed various potential bidding and offering processes. Some
are based on the idea of a limit order book. This is used in financial
markets to match bids and offers in buying stock. In the simplest case,
imagine that people wanting to buy a stock make offers that they will buy
certain amounts at certain prices. On the other side, people wanting to
sell make offers that they will sell certain amounts at certain prices. Then
the market-maker clears the market by allocating first the highest bid to
the lowest offer, then the next highest and so on. If there are ties, which is
usually the case because the allowed bids and offers are discretized) then
we will reach a situation where there is more demand for the cheapest offer
than the amount available. In this case, there are two ways of making the
allocation.
(a) Proportional: the bidders each receive a particular proportion of
their bid, the proportion being the supply:demand ratio.
(b) First-come-first-served: the supply is allocated to the bidders in the
time-order their bids came in.
(7.1.2) If this kind of process were applied to the grower-haulier allocation process,
then growers would enter bids of what they would pay for transport of their
beet in a particular time-slot. They could make multiple bids, expressing
(for instance) their preference for day or night,their preference between
different days. But only one of their bids will be accepted.
(7.1.3) On the other side, hauliers make offers of what haulage capacity they can
supply in each time-slot, and at what price. Then the bids and offers are
stacked up and handled in a similar way to the outline above. In the beet
context it seems that the second method of dealing with ties will fit better
with the way the industry operates, since it tends to ensure that more
growers are collected in consecutive time-slots.
(7.1.4) If such a system is to operate in the beet industry, it needs to include not
just growers and hauliers but the processing plants too. This introduces
complications but a potential approach was discussed and is outlined here.
The information that the growers and hauliers enter will be as mentioned
above. But the processing plants will also need to state what price they
are prepared to pay for beet delivered in particular time-slots. This may
vary from plant to plant. Also the time-slots may have limited amounts
of beet that can be booked into them.
(7.1.5) The process of clearing the market then could proceed by a grower accept-
ing a price and amount from a processing plant, and then having a certain
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time during which he accepts a certain offer, or offers, of transport, and
then confirms the whole arrangement when the different elements are in
place.
(7.1.6) It is important to avoid the situation of booking in to the processing plant
but then not being able to arrange transport.
(7.1.7) In this process, which is effectively an auction, the participants need to
have an incentive to bid their true values. This is done (in more conven-
tional auctions) by a Vickrey auction, in which the item is sold to the
highest bidder but at the price offered by the second-highest bidder. A
similar scheme would be needed in the beet market, but may have com-
plications because of the 3-participant nature.
A Expected cost integrals
We give a more detailed explanation of the method used in Subsection 4.7.
A.1 Distribution of path integrals
(A.1.1) Let X(t)t≥0 be a continuous-time Markov chain, which takes values in the
set S = {1, 2, 3, . . .} of allowed states and consider A to be a subset of S
containing all the states except the final one. We want to evaluate the
distribution of path integrals given by:
Γ =
∫ τ
0
fX(t)dt
where f is a non-negative real cost function and τ = inf{t > 0 : X(t) /∈ A}
is the hitting time of the final state.
(A.1.2) The function fi has the interpretation of cost per unit time of staying
in state i and, therefore, Γ is the total cost over the period spent in A
(with the assumption that A does not contain any absorbing state). The
Laplace transform of the distribution of path integrals defined above is
given by:
yi(θ) = Ei
[
e−θΓ
]
with the understanding that yi(θ) = 1 for i /∈ A.
(A.1.3) The following theorem provides a simple way of calculating this.
Theorem 1. For each θ > 0, y(θ) = (yi(θ), i ∈ I) is the maximal solution
to the system of equations:
∑
j∈I
qijzj = θfizi, i ∈ A
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with 0 ≤ zj ≤ 1 for j ∈ A, and qi,j the elements of the generator matrix
and zj = 1 for j /∈ A in the sense that y(θ) solves this system of equations
and, if z = (zi, i ∈ I) is any solution, then yi(θ) ≥ zi, ∀ i ∈ I.
(A.1.4) The Laplace transform of the distribution is closely related to the moment-
generating function (via a minus sign in the exponential), so by formal
differentiation of the system of equations given in the theorem we can
obtain all the moments of the distribution. In particular, one formal
differentiation gives us the expected value of the path integral (conditional
on the chain starting at i ∈ A).
(A.1.5) This methodology is very similar to the potential theory for Markov chains
(as presented, for example, by Norris [6]) and indeed gives the same exact
results. In such a context, one in principle could also consider discount fac-
tors but we have not included them in our model. See also the description
by Pollett et al.[5].
(A.1.6) The basic idea behind this technique is that we can define a continuous-
time Markov process on a state space with an absorbing state; the process
will, then, spend some time in the bulk of the state space, where it incurs
in a certain cost per unit of time spent in it, and then it will eventually hit
the boundary, where it stays forever (in more generality, there could also
be a cost when hitting the boundary, but this would just be a constant
added to the overall cost).
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